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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : District Court Case No. 
081902148 
ALLEN LLOYD, : 
Appellate Court No. 20090920 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of 
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated October 2, 2009. The 
Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree 
felony in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8(2). He was sentenced by the Honorable 
Michael D. Lyon to an indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison, and the sentence was stayed and the Defendant was placed on probation 
with a 30-day jail commitment. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS 
THE EVIDENCE OF THE ILLEGAL SEARCH AS 
VIOLATIVE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 
SECTION 14, AS WELL AS THE DEFENDANT'S 4TH 
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a mixed question of fact and law. The 
trial court's legal conclusions should be reviewed for correctness, according no 
deference to the trial court's conclusion. The trial court's findings of fact should be 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. "[Qjuestions of law are 
reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if 
clearly erroneous." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). This issue was 
preserved for appeal when the Defendant filed a motion to suppress and also 
entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). (R. 070/2-4). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Wan-ants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection (See Addendum 
B.) 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Article 1 Section 14: [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Article I, Section 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by 
express words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Article I, Section 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of 
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
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substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
§58-37-8(2) Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
§ 76-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of 
dangerous weapons by certain persons. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-
203.5; 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony; 
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101; or 
(iv) within the last 10 years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense 
which if committed by an adult would have been a violent felony as 
defined in Section 76-3-203.5. 
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony; 
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense which if committed by an adult would have been a felony; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Section 
58-37-2; 
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and 
intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled 
substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense; 
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony offense; 
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 
(1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
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(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or 
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the United 
States. 
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, 
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under 
his custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, 
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or 
has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; 
§77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
§77-23-104. Written plan — Approval of magistrate. (See Addendum E) 
§77-23-210. Force used in executing warrant — When notice of authority is 
required as a prerequisite. 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of the officer's authority and purpose, there is no response or 
the officer is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of the officer's authority and purpose, if the magistrate 
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e). Court of Appeals Jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant is charged in an information dated October 16, 2008, with 
the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Purchase, Transfer, Possession or 
Use of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a third-degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-10-503(3)(a); and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B. 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l). On November 12, 
2008, the Defendant made an initial appearance and the information was read. On 
February 5, 2009, the Defendant appeared for his preliminary hearing, and the 
matter was set for trial for April 2, 2009. The defense filed a motion to suppress 
evidence on March 5, 2009, and a hearing on the motion occurred on May 12, 
2009. Oral arguments and a ruling was rendered from the bench on June 18, 2009. 
Thereafter the Defendant entered into a plea negotiation on August 6, 2009, 
pleading guilty to the possession of controlled substance, a third-degree felony, 
with the dismissal of the other two counts, with the Defendant specifically 
preserving his right to appeal the court's ruling on the suppression motion. The 
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate tenn of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. The prison tenn was suspended, and the Defendant was 
placed on probation with a jail tenn of 30 days in jail as a condition of probation. 
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The defendant began his 30-day jail term on September 24, 2009, and has been 
released from jail. 
This judgment and conviction was entered on October 2, 2009, and the 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on October 20, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about March 8, 2008, Officer Powers from the Ogden City Police 
Department received a call regarding a green vehicle parked in a small parking lot 
behind an apartment building in which the caller resided. The caller apparently 
believed that the green vehicle was occupied by three people smoking drugs. (R. 
178/7 and 31) 
Officer Powers went to the address (370 - 28th Street), saw the vehicle and 
approached the vehicle. (R. 178/8) Officer Powers did not see any of the three 
occupants smoking. (R. 178/10) Officer Powers testified that he saw the 
Defendant, Allen Lloyd, sitting behind the wheel and that he approached the 
vehicle and could smell an odor of crack cocaine, which the officer testified 
smelled like cat urine. (R. 178/10-11) On cross-examination at the preliminary 
hearing, Officer Powers admitted that he did not observe any illegal activity; all he 
could do was smell an odor of what he believed was burnt cocaine. (R. 178/24) 
Officer Powers then testified at this point that he detained the Defendant, 
and he was not free to leave. (R. 178/24) Officer Powers questioned the Defendant, 
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asking him if there were any weapons or drugs in the vehicle, and the Defendant 
replied that there was a gun under his seat. (R. 178/24) Officer Powers did not ask 
the Defendant if he had a concealed weapons permit, and the officer also admitted 
that he did not get consent to search the vehicle nor did he get permission to 
retrieve the weapon. (R. 178/26) At that point, Officer Powers ordered the 
Defendant out of his vehicle, and he searched for the gun. (R. 178/26) The gun was 
located under the seat in a black bag. (R. 178/26) The gun was a .45-caliber, which 
upon examination had bullets in the magazine but no bullets in the chamber. (R. 
178/14) In addition to finding a firearm, Officer Powers also located a small, hard, 
brown glasses case. (R. 178/13) Officer Powers opened the glass case without 
permission from the Defendant while Defendant was in custody and in handcuffs. 
(R. 178/14-15) Inside the glasses case, Officer Powers found contained therein two 
dirty syringes. (R. 178/14) Officer Powers then placed the Defendant under arrest, 
searched his person, and found a baggie which contained methamphetamine. (R. 
178/16) 
At a May 12, 2009, hearing, James Gaskill testified as an expert witness. (R. 
179/4). His qualifications included working for the State Medical Examiner, 
running the crime lab for Weber State University and attending hundreds of 
trainings and seminars. (R. 179/5). He testified that he has worked on hundreds of 
drug cases and has experience in the field totaling more than 30 years. (R. 179/6) 
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Mr. Gaskill testified that in his experience in dealing with cocaine, there is no 
particular kind of smell that you can identify. (R. 179/7) In addition, Mr. Gaskill 
further testified that even when the substance is heated or vaporized it does not 
emit any particular smell. (R. 179/11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case stems from a citizen complaint of a possibility of some individuals 
smoking drugs in a car parked in an apartment complex parking lot late at night. 
The officer testified that he approached the vehicle, ordered the occupant to roll 
down the window, and then smelled the odor of cat urine. Despite the fact that the 
officer had no drug recognition training and had never been trained regarding the 
smell of drugs, the officer concluded that the occupants had been smoking cocaine, 
and asked the Defendant if he had any weapons. Upon the Defendant's truthful 
affirmative acknowledgment that he had a gun in his car, the officer removed the 
occupants, placed him in handcuffs, and search the car, finding not only the gun 
mentioned by the Defendant, but opening a small glasses case and finding the 
drugs in question. Based upon a solely subjective and later proved to be erroneous 
belief that cocaine smells like cat urine, the officer escalated the stop to a level II 
or level III and conducted a search either for weapons. The officer extended that 
search beyond the scope by looking into the glasses case and finding the drugs. 
Once the officer found the drugs, he then charged the Defendant with possession of 
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controlled substance as well as possession of a gun by a restricted person based 
solely upon the drugs found in the glasses case. 
Prior to the search, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that 
Defendant had committed any type of crime; and, therefore, according to 
established case law the stop was in violation of Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution as well as the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. Any evidence obtained after that constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree and 
should be excluded from evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS 
THE EVIDENCE OF THE ILLEGAL SEARCH AS 
VIOLATIVE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 
SECTION 14, AS WELL AS THE DEFENDANT'S FOURTH 
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
During the Revolutionary War the colonies fought to become sovereign 
states. After defeating the British they unified as a loose confederation, and several 
years later strengthened that union by replacing their Articles of Confederation 
with the United States Constitution. Under that constitution, the separate states 
retained most political power while allowing the federal government supremacy 
only in enumerated areas. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down a federal gun control law that Congress 
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lacked the power to create): "We start with first principles. The Constitution 
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.... As James Madison wrote, 
'[t]he powers delegated to the federal government are few and defined. Those 
which remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.'" Given the 
political philosophy underlying our history, this Court must view our state, not as a 
dependant subdivision of the national government, but a state with its own 
distinctive constitutional laws. 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Long, 431 U.S. 1032 
(1983) stated that if a state court decision is appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and the state court decision appears to be based on both federal and state law, but 
the "adequacy and independence" of the state law ground is not clear, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will assume that the state court decided as it did because it was 
required to do so by federal law. 
The Utah Constitution can protect rights to an extent that often goes 
unrecognized. Until recent times, the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights largely 
only restricted the federal government, not state governments. For most of the past 
two centuries, the declarations of rights in state constitutions—declarations that 
often included protections not listed in the Bill of Rights—provided the definitive 
lists of rights that states knew they were obliged to respect. Lately, these 
declarations of rights have been neglected. Since the Utah Constitution's 
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Declaration of Rights protects a number of rights not mentioned in the U.S. 
Constitution, it is essential for courts to look further than the U.S. Constitution and 
give adequate attention to the Utah Constitution when applying the law and 
making judicial decisions. 
The Utah Supreme Court in American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 
UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235, recognized the difference between the U.S. Constitution 
and the Utah Constitution and held: 
Although this court has not addressed whether the Utah 
Constitution protects nude dancing, prior cases provide guidance on 
how the freedom of speech provisions of the Utah Constitution 
should be interpreted. The scope of Utah's constitutional 
protections "may be broader or narrower than" those offered by the 
First Amendment, "depending on [our] state constitution's 
language, history, and interpretation." Id. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized that the scope of Utah's Constitution 
may differ from the U.S. Constitution. It has been established Utah values and 
protects the privacy rights of the individual, even when Federal Courts do not. 
In Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, | 14, 122 P.3d 506, (reversed 126 S. 
Ct. 1943 (2006)), the First District Court of Brigham City held that evidence 
obtained during a warrantless entry into a home was unlawful, and no 
circumstances existed to justify officer's warrantless entry. Id. The State then 
appealed to the Appellate Court which affirmed the trial court's decision. The 
State was then granted certiorari review in the Utah Supreme Court, which 
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likewise affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. The State then took the issue to 
the United States Supreme Court, in which all three of Utah's standing court 
decisions were overturned. 
It is apparent that Utah has a different standard than the Federal Courts when 
it comes to protecting the privacy of its citizens. The court in Brigham City cited 
State v. Brake, in which that court "concluded that Article I Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment 
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 
^jl5, 103P.3d699. 
Furthermore, in Brigham City the Appellate Court discussed the history of 
this state stating: 
"we engaged in an ongoing and robust discussion over whether and 
to what extent we should defer to the federal courts when called 
upon to interpret provisions of our Declaration of Rights, which 
parallel the federal Bill of Rights. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 
1234-42 (Utah 1996); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534-36 (Utah 
1994); State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460, 465-71 (Utah 1990). In 
Anderson, we counseled against departing from the guidance from 
federal courts except when "compelling circumstances" required it. 
910 P.2d at 1235. To do otherwise would cause unnecessary 
confusion and undercut the policy objective of giving clear direction 
to judges and law enforcement officials. Id. Justice Stewart in his 
concurrence cautioned against unquestioning fealty to federal 
precedent on matters of individual liberty. Id. at 1240. He defended 
his view by noting that "["tlhe framers of the Utah Constitution 
necessarily intended that this Court should be both the ultimate and 
final arbiter of the meaning of the provisions in the Utah Declaration 
of Rights and the primary protector of individual liberties.'" 
/d.(emphasis added). 
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Utah courts have more recently recognized the different standard between 
Utah and Federal law. The Supreme Court in State v. Tiedemann, 2007 WL 
1856929, 7 (Utah) stated: 
The fact that the state and federal constitutional language is identical 
does not require a claimant to create some threshold for independent 
analysis of the state language. This court, not the United States 
Supreme Court, has the authority and obligation to interpret Utah's 
constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process, and we 
owe federal law no more deference in that regard than we do sister 
state interpretation of identical state language. See, e.g., State v. 
Debooy, 2000 UT 32, f 12, 996 P.2d 546 (recognizing that Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment 
contain identical language, but stating that the court "will not 
hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where 
doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this state's 
citizens"). State v. Tiedemann, 2007 WL 1856929, *7 (Utah) 
Because Utah values the rights of its state's citizens, it has been recognized 
that the purpose of the federal system is to look first at state constitutional 
principles, then federal. Id. It is part of the inherent logic of federalism that state 
law be interpreted independently and prior to consideration of federal questions. 
Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. 
Bait L.Rev. 379, 383-84 (1980); see also West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 
999, 1006 (Utah 1994). This is so because the State cannot, conceptually, deny 
rights guaranteed by the federal constitution if the state action complained of is 
unlawful as a matter of state law. Thus, if state statutes, rules, or constitutional 
principles preclude the state action in question, there is no need to assess the 
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federal constitutionality of that action. See Linde, supra at 383. This analytical 
approach is known as the "primacy model," West, 872 P.2d at 1005-07, and we 
have endorsed it in a number of cases, see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-84 
(Utah 1991) (addressing defendant's claim under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution before proceeding to his claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution); Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Comm % 796 P.2d 
1256, 1261 (Utah 1990) ("[I]f the challenged statute cannot withstand attack under 
the state constitution, there is no reason to reach the federal question."). State v. 
Tiedemann, 2007 WL 1856929, *7 (Utah) 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the problem of interpreting law in 
State v. Worwood, 2007 WL 1791238 (Utah). In that case, the court held that, 
"When interpreting state constitutional provisions that are similar or identical to 
those in the federal constitution, we encourage a primacy approach. Under the 
primacy model, 'a state court looks first to state constitutional law, develops 
independent doctrine and precedent, and decides federal questions only when state 
law is not dispositive.'" State v. Worwood, 2007 WL 1791238 (Utah). 
The Utah Supreme Court and Appellate Court know the importance of 
interpreting Utah law prior to federal law and again recognize the difference 
between the protection granted under the Utah Constitution versus the Federal 
Constitution's Fourth Amendment. "In developing an independent body of state 
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search and seizure law, we have held that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution often provides greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth 
Amendment, despite nearly identical language." State v. Worwood, 2007 WL 
1791238 (Utah). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has held that courts must look at 
multiple factors in examining how to interpret state law from federal law. 
In construing the State constitution, the Utah Supreme Court has remarked 
favorably about the analytical framework employed in State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 
(Vt. 1985) which suggests the use of four principal sources of analytical material: 
(1) the history of the state constitution, (2) the textual construction of the 
provision, (3) a comparison with decisions of other state's courts construing their 
state constitutional provisions of similar or identical language, and (4) sociological 
materials. Id. at 23637. See State v. Ear!, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) ("We cite 
with approval the summary of scholarly commentary and analytic technique set 
forth by the Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Jewett"). The Jewett court 
indicated that these four approaches should not be considered exclusive of any 
other that an imaginative lawyer might offer, however. Jewett, 500 A.2d at 225, 
227 & n.14, citing P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate - Theory of the Constitution 25 
(1982) (describing six types of constitutional argument: the historical, the textual, 
the doctrinal, the prudential, the structural, and the ethical). According to Bobbitt, 
the historical argument examines the controversies, attitudes, and decisions of the 
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period during which the constitutional provision at issue was proposed and 
ratified. Id. at 7. The textual argument considers the present sense of the words of 
the provision. Id. Structural arguments are "claims that a particular principle or 
practical result is implicit in the structures of government and the relationships that 
are created by the Constitution among citizens and governments." Id. The 
prudential argument advances a particular doctrine according to the practical 
wisdom of the courts. Id. The doctrinal argument "asserts principles derived from 
precedent." Id. Finally, the ethical argument "relies on a characterization of 
American institutions and the role within them of the American people in 
attempting to legitimize judicial review of the constitutional provisions." Id. at 94. 
When looking to the protection of an individual's privacy, we can compare 
the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
That provision provides greater protection than the federal constitution 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Larocco_, 794 P.2d 460, 466-
68 (Utah 1990) (VIN of parked car not subject to warrantless search under state 
constitution); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 41 6-18 (Utah 1991) (depositor's 
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bank records protected under state constitution); State v. DeBooy_, 996 P.2d 546 
(Utah 2000) (stating "we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different 
construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this 
state's citizens.") (holding suspicionless traffic checkpoint invalid under state 
constitution); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) ("Choosing to 
give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to be an 
appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by the federal 
courts"). 
Looking at the history of the Utah State Constitution, in recent opinions the 
Utah Supreme Court has suggested that interpretation of the Utah Constitution 
may be greatly influenced by the historical events surrounding the drafting of the 
Constitution. See e.g.., Society of Separatists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 
-29 (Utah 1993) (concluding that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic" 
and examining events surrounding Utah's admission to statehood to interpret state 
constitutional prohibition of expending public money to support religious 
exercise). 
Unfortunately, no direct legislative history is available concerning the decision to 
include Article I, Section 14. Nevertheless, the intent of the drafters may be fairly 
inferred from the historical context in which the provision was included. Members 
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of the 1895 Utah Constitutional Convention understood from first-hand experience 
the necessity of adopting safeguards against unreasonable search and seizure. 
Tracey E. Panek, Search and Seizure Antipolygamy Raids, 62 Utah Hist. Q. 316, 
317 (1994) (hereafter "Panek"). Utah pioneers suffered persecution at the hands of 
murderous mobs in Ohio and Illinois, fled the extermination order of Missouri's 
Governor Boggs, and suffered more persecution in the Utah Territory from federal 
marshals engaged in warrantless raids of their homes in search of polygamy-law 
offenders. Kenneth R. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure 
Jurisprudence under the Utah Constitution, Article I Section 14, 17 J. Contemp. L. 
267 (1991) at 276. The Desert News recounted the warrantless Utah raids as 
"outrages," "earned out without even a warrant giving the perpetrators the 
authority [to search]." Panek, at 327 (quoting, Beret News, March 10, 1886); see 
also Paul Wake, Rights, and Free Government: Do Utahns Remember, Rev. 661, 
671 -91 (1996). 
This early Utah problem with searches conducted without proper warrants 
was noted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. DeBooy, 2002 UT 32, \ 14, 996 
P.2d 546 wherein it stated: 
This states' early settlers were themselves no strangers to the abuses 
of general warrants. Underlying the abuse of the general warrant was 
the perversion of the prosecutorial function from investigating 
known crimes to investigating individuals for the purpose of finding 
criminal behavior. A free society cannot tolerate such a practice. Id. 
at 552. 
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Justice Stewart also believed that hisior\ of the Utah Constitution provided a 
basis for a heightened expectation of privacy. In his concurring opinio- in ^tatc v. 
Anderson. ^ • • • ...*. [ .: ..;.• . s- -• I I K ; , ^ . * : a;,a because I;JC trainers*- ;:;e 
I Ital i Constiti itioi i i 1 lodified cei tail 1 prov isioi is it i tl le Bill • :)f R ights before they 
were placed ii i tl le I Ita h Constiti ition's Declaration of R ights. ai id evei i added 
certain provisions not found in the federal constitution, the Utah Supreme Court 
should not be bound to construe Utah Constitutional provisions in light of federal 
law M a t 124(1 
Thus, it is fair to say that the history surrounding the preparation of UK \. lah 
Constitution, perhaps more than any other siaij because ... :u,„ msur \ reaeral 
iiory i \ v . - • ' .*! ,-. . ,. ^- > v- \ • -. ^n ^ • y 
M-
 : s i ; u\[: r ::. • : *: -• -"• ' •• • • : * : * • • \ - -1r-1 i * ^ . •• e 
protections of privacy oi its citizens against the type of repression that they had 
experienced theretofore. The unique history of Tie Utah Constitution, therefore, 
provides a basis for reaching different, more protectiv e decisions thv- v. onkl a 
federal court coi istri ling tl le I ; oui th Amendment. 
1 1 le : secoi id n lethod of a nalysis recon i n: lei ide d by 1:1 le I Ital i Supi ei i le Court is: 
(Utah 1986). On its face, Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is nearly 
identical to Uic Fourth Amendment. The only textual difference between the two 
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constitutional provisions is one of punctuation and grammar. Because of the close 
textual similarity between the two constitutional provisions, the Utah Supreme 
Court will not draw a distinction between the constitutional provisions based 
merely upon a textual analysis. See State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 
1988). 
Notwithstanding the textual similarity of the state and federal provisions, on 
more than one occasion, the Utah Supreme Court has held that Article I, Section 14 
provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in State v. DeBooy, 
2002 UT 32,1 21, 996 P.2d 546, the Utah Supreme Court held a traffic checkpoint 
to be unlawful under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The court 
distinguished a suspicionless roadblock upheld by the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) and stated that 
Fourth Amendment precedent is persuasive, but not binding when Utah courts are 
construing the Utah constitution. DeBooy, 996 P.2d at 551. The court noted that 
although the Utah and federal constitutions search and seizure provisions "contain 
identical language" . . . the court "will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a 
different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of 
this state's citizens." Id. at 549. Justice Durham stated that "multi-purpose, general 
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warrant-like intrusions j„ LAC p :^ac\ of persons using :he hi0h\\a> s are 
unacceptable" and therefore violate the Utah State Constitution. Id. at 554, 
Another case in which the I Jtah Supreme Court, decided not to follow the 
iederal standard is State v. Thompson, 810 1 :) 2d A 15 (I iti ill 1991). Ii I 1 hompson, the 
c -oi irt ri tied that defet idai its 1 la \/e the I ight to be free Ii on i i n n easoi lable seai cl les 
and seizures of their bai ik statements '1 'his decisioi I directly coi iti adicted tl le 
United States Supreme Cour t ' s holding in United States v. Miller, 42 j U.S. 455, 
442, 96 S.Ct. ; o ; y , 1023-24, 48 L.Ed.2d 7 1 , 7*-79 ^2976J, m winch the Court 
held -hat the government can seize bank records without a Four th Amendment 
violation because a hank depos ing has no reasonable expectat ion ol p n v a e \ . i'he 
i \d\\ s up reme Court ,.. ..-; ^ . • . ;JIML; ,*it grounds ; ..a several 
i ^i,'1- • iJ • . **• i*. " \}iJ! v '^oKh .* ' - ' •• •• v' J ,'-. \ -t : M.i»ns. 
Thompson, 810 P.2d at 410 16. 
, despite the similarity of the language between the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I. Section 14, the state constitution has been construed as 
providing more proieciion againsi unreasonable search and sei/iux -•> ne citizens 
of I 'tali, thai i does federal coi istiti itioi i 
• . I •< >c )kii lg i HI d( )ct! ii u il | >i ii ieipl.es, 1 .1 u ; i I i , • ;;t I x i, ,i< < n first pi inciple ; ; : 1 
constitutional analysis should always be kept ii i sharp focus to avoid iw.'./y 
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decision-making. Article I, Section 27, states: "Frequent recurrence to fundamental 
principles is essential to the security of individual rights ...." 
Section 26 of Article I, is also important; it states: "The provisions of this 
Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are 
declared to be otherwise." Section 26 was relied on by the court in State v. 
Thompson for finding protection of bank depositor's records. Thompson, 810 P.2d 
at 416-18. 
Among the most fundamental of fundamental principles is the sanctity of 
the home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), and cases cited therein. 
Directly related to judicial enforcement of the above principles is the 
exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is principally designed to deter violations 
of the Fourth Amendment. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). By 
excluding evidence discovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the rule 
"compels respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available 
way, by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 217. 
This Court has ruled that the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the 
Utah Constitution in the recent case of State v. Yount, 2008 UT App. 102, ^  24, 182 
P.3d 405. In that case the Court held "Thus, under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, the evidence obtained through the State's illegal subpoenas to the 
Hospital must be suppressed unless an exception to the exclusionary rule applies." 
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Analyzing Utah Statutes, we unci that 7 "tub >\iiuies provide protections 
against unreasonable search.es and seizures beyond what the Fourth Amendment 
provides. For example. Flan statutory law requires reasonable suspiuc; •<,:• .: 
seizure. Uiah ("ode Ann. ^ / " * " \'> states lliai a "peace officer may slop an\ person 
ii i a pi iblic place whei i he 1 ias c r ret is one Me SUSJ,, ricion to believe he 1 las committed or 
'•
 ;be '):" of commit! m-1 or is auonipim:- to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation ef his actions."1 (Emphasis added). 
The Fourth Amendmen: on the other ban.1. J - e s not a lwa \ s require reasonable 
suspicion, See. e.g., United States v. Martinez ^uerk\ 4_o> l v -o e( o-: , '.-*> 
*-^  * . <. . ' - s:- affirming co\ \ ^:\^:\> .:. _ a ^ 
• M-V. -,*:*'* • • • * -Hr *f> - - r r h - • . o h ; e ihc 
i ourth Amendment and stating that although "some quantum of individualized 
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure, the Fourth 
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion, ") (emphasis 
added). 
I Uali i units have held that •.caiclies coiulik led in loLiiion of suae Mamie are 
i mreasonable I "OJ exai i iple, by si .ati it e, police sei v ii ig a seai el. i vv arrant ma> enter a 
house without notice of Lhcir autl lority and ^ i m ^ e ^nu u the warrant specifically 
authorizes them to do so. 
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When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into 
any building..., the officer executing the warrant may use such force 
as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate 
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give 
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that 
the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice were 
given. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-210. 
In State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1994), the Utah court of appeals 
held that where police violated this knock-and-announce statute by failing to knock 
on the apartment door and announce their presence and authority, the marijuana 
found in the defendant's apartment should have been suppressed. Id. at 407, 412. 
Similarly, the successful appellant in State v. DeBooy, 2002 UT 32, f 14, 996 
P.2d 546, relied on §77-7-15 and other state statutory analysis as grounds for 
urging the court to reject the roadblock exception set forth in federal case Martinez 
-Fuerte. On considering this issue, the court held unconstitutional under Article I 
Section 14 the roadblock scheme at issue in that case. DeBooy. The opinion raised 
two main concerns. First, the plan failed to provide guidelines as to what such a 
search should entail or how it should be conducted, thus violating the very statute 
authorizing roadblocks, Utah Code. Ann. §77-23-104(2)(b). Id. at 551-52. And 
second, the court raised the concern that suspicionless roadblocks conflict with 
"the general rule" that reasonable articulable suspicion is required. Id. at 549. The 
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DeBooy court held that, "Failure to employ the exclusionary ruie to such a blatant 
violation of a statute would reduce Article I Section 14's prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures to nothing more than a form of words . See 
Ihc prnilciiiial ai'Liumenl ,iil\ .iiicc-i a pailictiLir i lodr ine according u< me 
chosen to depart from federal Four th Amendment interpret.f •<> * <. >r 
the pu ipose of establishing a more workable rule ibr pol ice and trial courts than 
exists under confusing federal case law." SIJK \ Jacks, m, 937 P.2d 545, 5 48-49 
(i :iah App. .• •'•• r ) : see also State v. Brake, 2004 I IT 95 , | 1 ^ 103 P.3d 699 ("we 
<; -• : ,e11!ineos . \ .. s;.,,. . * J ; i * Amendmen t j11••:sprudence 
coi icerning tl i = • police officer safe t) justification foi \ varrai ltless automobile 
searches finding that the federal authority ,, i e A,/ e w Yoih \ (\fn\s. V 1 I S 106 
(1986) , "subverts the workable principles found in Utah Ln\ Bmlu I U i P Id 
at 7 0 3 - 0 4 . 
1 1 le fedei al law regarding search ant. seizure "has become a labyrinth of 
n ' • * er •/* •; i \ i ;mg MUonalization and 
distinctions I -• ; •• • • .* ^'*ri. .i< .» - -. *••*. .->M .. : , . J S , -. • -. >ugh 
this labyrinth often imperil both, the rights of itidi\ iduals ,iml lln1 n i iegnn and 
effectiveness of law enforcement." State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271 -72 (Utah 
1985). 
Delegates to the Utah Constitutional Convention endured outrageous 
warrantless raids of their homes and desired to include protection from that sort of 
invasion in Utah's Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court has said that in fact the 
Utah Constitution does provide greater protections than the federal constitution. 
Moreover, the federal rule actually guarantees the right of police to make 
warrantless intrusions in every case. What once was the "chief evil" becomes 
judicially protected conduct. The rule should be clear that in Utah warrantless 
entries require suppression. As the dissenting justices in Murray v. United States, 
487 U.S. 533 (1988) indicated, the rule is subject to easy abuse and creates an 
intolerable incentive for warrantless searches. 
Applying the above-described federal and state constitutional provisions to 
the factual situation in the case at hand we see a clear violation of both state and 
federal constitutions. The officer in this case received an anonymous citizen 
complaint of someone smoking drugs in a car in the dead of night. A reasonable 
view of this complainant's call and his/her allegations would suggest that he/she 
had no idea whether the individuals were smoking illegal drugs or totally legal 
tobacco. The officer, in investigating the situation, approached the Defendant's 
car; and according to his testimony he immediately escalated the stop to at least a 
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level 2 encounter. At that point the Defendant was not free to leave, and was under 
total control of the officer. The officer, in fact, testified ihat he. .aon mereh 
smelling an odor oi cai urine, asked i.iu./ Defendant ii lie nad any weapons; and 
upon his affirmative response order.-,.: ,.,. i^a. i .^au ir-m me Ncm,.-,. . ;,, w;:;,.er 
ml il iml bother lo ii)i|iiii\ a-, to llu po isihihh of u concealed weapon pcrini! I wn 
w hen the Defei idant a ck i iowl edged that he had a gi in i 11 ider the seat of 1 lis cai the 
officer exceeded ine permissible bounds oi a 'Ja a search b\ >lacing the 
Defendant under arrest for possession of a legal firearm, which became illegal only 
upon the discover}" that the Defendant wa^ engaged hi the possession, use .v: 
distribution •> -AW-.- >,, / uva v - h}tlf. > - N> V. ' ; :868, JU i .i d .d 
unreasonable searches and seizures by orvniup .. -•: , - ^ ;as^- -v-* . i * 
obvious!)* could not ha\e contained a weapon, ii ib bu&ed upon the uisco\e^ M 
the syringe contained in the small brown glasses case that the officer determined 10 
place Lie Defendant under arrest (for the possession of a firearm while engaged in 
jHsssesM-:. * .. .[
 vi. :; ;*.:.,.•: e . .. , ., • . ;i,\ ,i!4Ler placing i.K !>etendant 
under arrest ami seaivhiir, his person in> ideul l-i- arrest ihat ilk: ullicei di.scouTud 
the methamphetamiiic oi wii i^ -^  ' • • ' . . , • : - •. •'-••^ d. 
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In the recently decided case of State v. Parke, 2009 UT App. 50, the Utah 
Court of Appeals overturned a conviction of an individual on the basis of an illegal 
search and seizure. In that case the State (and presumably the officer) identified 
four basic reasons for the detention and search of the defendant after he was pulled 
over for a traffic violation as follows: 
(1) Officer Anderson effectuated a traffic stop, and traffic stops are 
inherently dangerous, .... (2) based on his previous experiences 
when seeing such a movement [shrugging of shoulder and other 
physical movement], Officer Anderson subjectively believed that 
Parke may have been hiding a weapon or drugs in his waistband area 
because of Parke's shoulder movement,... (3) Parke became 
"somewhat agitated" and questioned Officer Anderson's order to 
place his hands outside the vehicle, ...(4) according to Officer 
Anderson, the area he patrolled was "very dangerous", (id at f 8) 
The Utah Court of Appeals analyzed all of these supposed indicators and ruled that 
the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendant was in possession 
of drugs or weapons as follows: 
1. With regard to the first fact, while traffic stops are inherently 
dangerous,... "[D]espite the danger that inheres in on-the-
street encounters and the need for police to act quickly for 
their own safety, . . . Terry requires reasonable, individualized 
suspicion before a frisk for weapons can be conducted." 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334-35 n.2 (1990). (id at %9) 
2. Turning to the second fact listed above, although Officer 
Anderson believed Parke's shoulder movement indicated that 
Parke may have been hiding a weapon or drugs in his 
waistband—and only the former is relevant in considering the 
propriety of a Terry frisk in any event—we conclude that this 
belief was a "hunch" or an "inchoate suspicion," not a 
"particular fact" or "particular inference" that justified the 
29 
protective frisk of Parke. A police officer 's subjective be l i e ' is 
just one factor in th- totality of ihe ci^. umsiances a n a K s ^ .-.nd 
is jioi determinative of whether reasonable suspicion ac i ^ . l h 
existed The I "-tab Supreme Court h:ts previously determined 
that "!"m]ere furtive gestures of an occupam of an automobile 
do not g i \ e rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal 
activihf* State v. .SW//av.sv/\ ~7~vi : \2<; : ^ -2 . 1137 H uah 
l98Q).Vidat1f i m 
3 . i h e third LL-. WL- m u r d e r is inat I'lii'kv oecame "somewuai 
agitated"" and quest ioned Officer Ander son ' s order to place 
both of Parke 's bands outside the window. "When confronied 
Willi a traffic slop, ii is not uncommon f^ : -ir-w^* ' •» .* 
nervous and excited].]" (id at Tl 2) 
4. flic fourth lacl. that a slop occurs m a hiLh crime area, is a 
factor in determining whether a protective frisk is warranted. 
Sec State w Brake, 200-J [' I 95. \M \ <P V W GW. } Iowe\ ei\ 
""an area ' s reputation !••:• criminal activit} .-hould *v: He 
imputed to an individual"; additional c a d e n c e need- -c 
support that the person is engaged in suspet ( activity. lio-^-- ^ 
"
7
- P :d at ^ ' U M a «'M citations included) 
1.1 i tl i e pi e s ei it c as e, the o ffi cei 1 lad 1 e s s i . a r• : •. •: . ..; ,. .; * _ . L i
 t j o: • k e r , ; . i n e 
above™' cited Pc u ke ca se. "1 ; i ir then nore, tl ie office! 's oi \b • artici ilated claii n of di ug 
usage was the citizen complaint that oiiK Uated mat ^ *<>•• - ••• ^ -i.. . in - *he 
car, together with the supposed smell oi' burning cocaine which "smells like cat 
urine". (R. 17^ / 1 ' N This claim of the odor of cocaine is in direct contravention of 
a., - r u g experts, . ^ . u d n m tn^ I >clendant s expert, James Gaskill, who opines that 
aitei I landlii ig tl lousai ids < >;i sai I ipk is < >i cocaii ie, he can state tl mt it has no smell. 
(See attached Idler of ,I:iiue<; (iaskill \ddendiiui i >i hirtbeiTnoiw i! "• ' parhui lar 
significance to note that in the suppression bennm- I )fficer Powers testified that he 
had "not received training in drug recognition procedures"(R. 179/41), is "not a 
drug recognition expert" (R. 179/41), and has never "been taught that cocaine has a 
particular smell."(R. 179 pg41). 
Despite the fact that the defense requested a suppression hearing, notified 
the prosecution of the expert testimony of James Gaskill regarding the lack of 
smell of cocaine, the prosecution, who has the burden of proof in a suppression 
hearing failed to call any expert regarding any potential smell of cocaine. The 
testimony of Prof. James Gaskill was therefore unrebutted. 
Additionally, the standard utilized in the determination as to whether an 
officer has probable cause to arrest is an objective one. "The validity of the 
probable cause determination is made from the objective standpoint of a 'prudent, 
reasonable, cautious police officer ... guided by his experience and training."' 
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). This standard is identical to the 
Federal standard as set forth in Devenpeck v. Alford 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S.Ct. 
588, 593 - 594 (U.S.,2004) where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled: 
Our cases make clear that an arresting officer's state of mind (except 
for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable 
cause. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813, 116 S.Ct. 
1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (reviewing cases); **594 Arkansas v. 
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (per 
curiam). That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest 
need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide 
probable cause. 
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In the present case, the objective information available to the officci simph *• ' 
not rise to the level which would allow probable cause for an arrest. This objective 
analysis would not even support reasonable suspicion that a. crime had occurred. 
r»v.- tuij. ina mere .-n i\>.: ^ no smell to smoked cocaine narrows +he officer's 
.- .v-. ••;:.« • . • *: r - - ^ *- . -U11^ meY s a w someone 
• ; me .' ,:-' ,; ! • ' officer's iiu|uir "nln possible drugs 01 weapons, 
the Defendant mentions he has a gun i inder the seat which is retrieved ai id I b\ ind to 
be in a legal1 condition. Ai:> action by the officer thereafter is in direct violation 
of the Defendant's constitutional rights. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis of the Utah and federal constitutional 
guarantees, tm acijnaai i :vhe\e> iuai nis rights were violated, the officer went 
1
 I J.C.A. 1953 § 76-10-505(1) Carrying loaded fireatm V. vehicle or on street: 
Unless otherwise authorized by law,, a person rna) not carry a loaded firearnn(a) in 
or on a vehicle; 
U.C.A. 1953 ^ '6-iOoU:. When\v:afK:, u.cm.u .„aueu 
(i
 ; 1 or the purpose of this chapter. an\ pistol. revoKer. shotgun, ruie, oi oim. 
weapon described in this part shall be deemed lo be loaded when there is an 
unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in the firing position. 
U • i'i .loU ctnd revolvers shall also be deemed to he loaded when an unexpended 
cartridge, shel: or project! ie is in a position whereb\ ihe manna! operation of any 
mechanism one:.- would cause the unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile to be 
fired. 
beyond permissible steps in his search of the defendant's vehicle in-person, and 
pursuant to long-standing case law the evidence should therefore be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant respectfully requests this court 
reverse the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, and remand 
for further proceedings. 
DATED this #? day of April 2010. 
^NDALL Wy RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plai 
.MIMJTES 
APP\ SENTENCING i f f J S — — : t; 
I OCT 0 2 2.003 ISENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
v s . \ L——^croNO : C a s 4 N o : 081902148 FS 
ALLEN SMITH LLOYD,\ b R , c T CQjjlfiiXudge: MICHAEL D LYON 
Defendan t DISTRICT^ 
'TinT fi 0 n 
Date : S e p t e m b e r 24, 2009 
?nnn 
PRESENT 
Clerk: shannone 
Prosecutor: SAUNDERS, L. DEAN 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): NEELEY, GLEN W 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 19, 1945 
Audio 
Tape Number: 4D092409 Tape Count: 2:02-2:10 
CHARGES 
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/06/2009 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. The defendant is present and 
represented by Glen Neeley. 
Defense counsel represents that the defendant has an appointment 
set to schedule surgery. 
The Court is willing to impose the sentence today, but stay the 
jail sentence until after the defendant has had surgery. 
Defense counsel agrees to proceed today. 
Defense counsel further addresses the Court. 
The defendant answers the inquiries of the Court. 
The State declines to address the Court. 
The Court directs the defendant to obtain a letter from his 
surgeon stating a reasonable period of convalescence. 
The Court will make a determination as to when the defendant shall 
report to the jail once the letter is received. 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
JD29901914 pages: 3 
081902148 LLOYD,ALLEN SMITH 
Page 1 
Ox 
Case No: 081902148 
Date: Sep 24, 2009 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term, i s suspended. 
SENTENCE J AIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 30 day(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$ 5 5 5 . 0 u 
$0.00 
$268.51 
$555,00 
$555 
$0 
$268 
$555, 
Plus 
0 0 
51 
00 
Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 3 0 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 555.0 0 wl lich Includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
The defendant shall enter into an. agreement with the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its 
terms and conditions. 
The defendant shall report to the Depar t .mei it of Correct :ions ai id to 
the court whenever required. 
The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse 
evaluation and any treatment deemed necessary by AduJ t ProbaUon k 
Parole, paying all costs, 
The defendant shall not consume or possess any alcohol or illegal 
drugs. 
Page 2 
Case No: 081902148 
Date: Sep 24, 2009 
The defendant shall not frequent establishments where alcohol is 
the chief menu item nor associate with persons using alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult 
Probation & Parole, and pay all costs. 
Date 
D LYON 
Cour t Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the 
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any 
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of 
age in such State. 
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the 
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof But Congress may 
by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in 
aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss 
or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be 
held illegal and void. 
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
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MR. 
MR. 
being 
MR. 
exclude the \ 
fine. 
BY MR. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
THE 
MR. 
Off: 
THE 
RICHARDS: We'd like to call --
DAINES: -- James Gaskill. 
JAMES GASKILL, 
first duly sworn, testifies as 
RICHARDS: Your Honor, I'd like 
witnesses at this point. 
COURT: All right. 
DAINES: If they want to do an 
Leer Powers, can you sit up here 
COURT: Go ahead, please. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
RICHARDS: 
State your name, please. 
My name is James Gaskill. 
And, 
I'm 
University. 
Q. And 
University? 
A. 
follows: 
to move to 
exclusion, that's 
, please? 
Jim, what do you do for a living? 
a retired emeritus professor from Weber State 
how long did you teach at Weber 
Well, I still teach a little bit, bi 
State 
it I started 
teaching in 1970, and I've pretty much continuously taught 
since 
Q. 
A. 
then. 
And in what field have you taught? 
Criminal justice, specifically forensic science. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
(801) 395-1056 
Q. And I want to lay a little background information in 
that regard. What kind of training did you receive in 
forensics? 
A. Well, I started working for the State Medical 
Examiner during my years in graduate school at the University 
of Utah. I graduated in the field of biology. I worked for 
the medical examiner as an investigative assistant. Then I 
went to the Santa Clara County Laboratory of Criminalistics 
for a research associate training. 
Then I began the crime lab for Weber State in 1972. 
I've attended hundreds of seminars. I was a member of the 
American Academy of Forensic Science, the California 
Association of Criminalists, the Northwest Association of 
Forensic Science, and I've been to many, many of their 
training sessions. And I have also been to the F.B.I, 
academy training in Quantico, Virginia. 
Q. Okay. And as an operator of the crime lab at Weber 
State University -- I guess college back then, but --
originally but then university -- did you have occasion to do 
analysis on various types of drugs? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Explain to the Court what your expertise is in this 
area . 
A. Well, I was -- that was a main part of the 
assignment at the laboratory. Probably 70 percent of the 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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cases that were submitted to the laboratory which amounted to 
thousands and thousands of cases were drug identification, so 
I've b 
years 
thousa 
een trained in that. I've done it for these many, many 
since 1970. I've examined and identified thousands and 
nds of different submissions of controlled substances 
and testified thousands of times. 
Q. 
on dru 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
well. 
A. 
policy 
And the vast majority of those testimonies, I guess, 
gs have been on behalf of the State. Is that correct? 
That's correct. 
That means you were called by the State. 
Called by the State, right. 
Okay. Lately you've been doing some defense work as 
Is that correct? 
Yes. Well, I already did some. We -- our -- our 
was not to exclude, but when someone brought us 
evidence, we analyzed it and reported on it. 
Q. Okay. The -- at some point the crime lab was moved 
from Weber State to the State Crime Lab. Is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And since that time have you continued in your drug 
analyst teaching? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
So you still have a lab at Weber State University? 
We have a teaching facility which includes 
instruments necessary for that kind of work, yes. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 Q. So drugs are analyzed there on a routine basis 
2 during the process of teaching students --
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. how to do that --
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. particular science. 
7 Have you during the course of your career ever 
8 analyzed cocaine? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And do you have any idea how many times? 
11 A. Hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of times. 
12 Q. During your analysis of cocaine, do you come in 
13 contact at least (unintelligible) with the --
14 A. Well, as it's within a few inches of our face when 
15 we do the analysis and we're moving it from the packaging and 
16 putting it in the test tubes and putting into spot plates and 
17 so, yeah, it's -- it's there. 
18 Q. Okay. And specifically we're asking some questions 
19 about cocaine and the smell of cocaine. In your vast 
20 experience in dealing with cocaine, can you give a testimony 
21 as to whether -- as to what kind of smell that exhumes? 
22 A. No. Doesn't have any particular kind of smell that 
23 you can identify. 
24 Q. That's even when you're, like you've testified, 
25 inches from the substance? 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 A. Correct. 
2 Q. And during the course of your analysis of cocaine, 
3 and I want to direct your attention specifically to cocaine, 
4 do you ever have occasion to mix it with other substances and 
5 preparations? 
6 A. Well, we mix it with various solvents and so forth 
7 in the course of the analysis. 
8 Q. Okay. And so you testified that -- let me -- that's 
9 a bad question. 
10 Normally how do you receive the cocaine, in what 
11 physical substance? I mean is it liquid, solid? 
12 A. Oh, cocaine is typically received in the crime 
13 laboratory as a powder. 
14 Q. Okay. Looks kind of like powdered sugar or 
15 something of that nature? 
16 A. Yeah, it might even contain powdered sugar. 
17 Q. And you testified you smelled the cocaine on 
18 numerous occasions in powdered substance and there's no smell 
19 to cocaine. 
20 A. Sometimes -- sometimes there's a smell, but it's not 
21 something that is in any way definitive or reliable. You 
22 know, may get various odors, primarily from the things that 
23 it's been diluted with or perhaps something that is a residue 
24 from an earlier processing procedure. But we have a standard 
25 bottle of cocaine which we've had in our laboratory for many 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 I years which is certified pure cocaine. 
2 | Q. Okay. 
3 I A. And we deal with that. Every time we do a cocaine 
4 test we have to compare it to a standard. And so I've opened 
5 that bottle hundreds and hundreds of times, and there's no 
6 smell to it that I've been able to detect that emanates from 
7 the bottle, nor have any of my colleagues ever indicated to 
8 me that they --
9 MR. DAINES: Objection, Your Honor. That's hearsay. 
10 THE COURT: Sustained. 
11 MR. DAINES: Thank you. 
12 Q (BY MR. RICHARDS) Do you have a normal sense of 
13 smell, to the best of your knowledge? 
14 MR. DAINES: Objection, Your Honor. He would have 
15 no way of knowing that. 
16 MR. RICHARDS: I think — 
17 THE COURT: Your question is: Is there a usual --
18 what did you say? 
19 MR. DAINES: Does he have a normal sense of smell. 
20 MR. RICHARDS: Does he have — 
21 THE COURT: Just a minute. I'm talking to 
22 Mr. Richards. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: Does he have a normal sense of smell. 
24 THE COURT: Oh, personally. 
25 MR. RICHARDS: Personally. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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19 
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might as 
anything 
that wou 
capacity 
Q 
have you 
smell? 
A. 
Q-
smell? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
lab, are 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
THE COURT: I wonder how he would know that. You 
k -- you might want to rephrase it and see if there's 
that is -- if he's ever had an injury or something 
Id interfere with what would be a normal smell 
(BY MR. RICHARDS) To the best of your knowledge, 
ever had an injury that would affect your sense of 
No. 
Any birth defect that would affect your sense of 
Not that I'm aware of. 
Are you able to smell many substances? 
Yes. 
During your course in your -- as an analyst in the 
you able to smell other substances? 
Yes. 
Such as? 
Well, various solvents, for example, had no trouble 
distinguishing between them. 
Q-
A. 
Marijuana? 
Marijuana, certainly can smell that and lots of 
smells that come from chemicals that come from some other 
substances. For example, amphetamines depending on how 
they're processed, the processing can leave a residue which 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 is pretty easy to recognize. I smell that quiet well. I 
2 don't -- never --
3 Q. So you are able to smell things? 
4 A. I've never noticed that I had a worse sense of smell 
5 than people around me. 
6 Q. Okay. Now, normally -- getting back to the 
7 question. Normally you receive cocaine in a solid or in a 
8 powdered substance. 
9 A. Correct. 
10 Q. Do you ever -- and you said you have liquified it in 
11 certain testing procedures? 
12 A. We dissolve it in solvents for analysis purposes. 
13 Q. And during the dissolving process are you able to 
14 smell the cocaine? 
15 A. No. 
16 THE COURT: Have you ever heated it? 
17 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: Does it emit any smell when you burn it? 
19 MR. DAINES: Careful here. 
20 THE WITNESS: Burning it is probably the wrong term, 
21 but when you heat it and vaporize it, it doesn't emit any 
22 particular smell that I've ever noticed, and I've done that a 
23 number of times. 
24 Q (BY MR. RICHARDS) Following up on that question, you 
25 are familiar, are you not, Mr. Gaskill, as to how cocaine is 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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normally ingested? 
A. The most common ways I'm familiar with are --
Q. What would that be? 
A. Well, the most common way is to inhale it through 
the nose. 
Q. And how do they accomplish that? 
A. Put it on a smooth surface, make it into a sort of a 
line, and sniff it up their nose through some kind of a 
hollow tube. 
Q. As a powder? 
A. As a powder. 
Q. But they can also -- I've heard the term smoking 
cocaine. 
MR. DAINES: Objection, Your Honor. We would ask 
for direct questions here. He's trying to lead. Mr. Gaskill 
is not answering the questions that are relevant in this 
case, and now they're trying to lead him through it. 
THE COURT: Well, I think -- if I understood the 
question, I think what he was going to say was -- was sort of 
background and not necessarily --
MR. DAINES: All right. 
THE COURT: -- the question, so overruled at the 
present time. 
MR. RICHARDS: I forgot the question now, so good 
objection, Bill. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 Q (BY MR. RICHARDS) Let me ask you, are there other 
2 ways that cocaine is ingested? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And what would be those methods? 
5 A. Well, it is often injected. It can be altered. The 
6 cocaine that we -- when we say cocaine then typically we are 
7 referring to the hydrochloride salt form. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 A. It can be altered to remove that hydrochloride and 
10 then it becomes a free base which is commonly called crack. 
11 Crack is -- has a lower -- has a lower vaporizing point than 
12 the salt form. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 A. And so they can heat that up and it vaporizes and 
15 then they inhale the vapors and that's what they call smoking 
16 crack. ItTs not technically smoking like tobacco because 
17 we're not burning it. We're just simply heating it till it 
18 vaporizes and then inhaling that through the use of what they 
19 call a pipe which can be anything that -- a glass tube or 
20 whatever. 
21 Q. So they vaporize it and then inhale the vapor. 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. Okay. And that would -- would that give off a 
24 smell, to the best of your knowledge? 
25 A. None that I've ever smelled. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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MR. RICHARDS: Okay. I think that's all the 
questions I have. 
BY MR. 
Q. 
appears 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
that --
Q. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
DAINES: 
You've indicated that typically you think cocaine 
in powder form. 
That's correct. 
That's what you said. Is that correct? 
Yes. 
It's also injected. 
Yes. 
But it can be made into the crack form. 
That's right. 
Have you ever burned crack cocaine? 
Yes. 
Where? 
In the laboratory. 
Over what? 
Over — over what? 1 
Yeah. 
I don't understand the question. 
What do you need to burn crack cocaine? 
Simply on a watch glass or some -- not in a pipe so 
no one inhaled it. 
Not -~ and that is how -- I mean, you're as old as I 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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am. Right, Jim? 
A. Well, i'm not sure if I'm as old as you are, Bill. 
Q. You're talking about injection and powder forms of a 
drug which are now typically smoked in pipes. You know that, 
don't you? 
A. Well, crack is smoked in pipes. 
Q. Right and --
A. But certainly --
Q. -- crack is a form of cocaine. 
A. It is a form of cocaine, correct. 
Q. Have you gone over with these lawyers behind me the 
kind of cocaine that was found in this car? 
No. I haven't seen any laboratory results. 
You haven't been through them about the facts of the 
A. 
Q. 
case. 
A. Only very briefly. 
Q. Okay. If I were to tell you that crack was being 
smoked in a pipe in the car, that's different from what you 
do in the lab. Isn't that correct? 
A. Well, we don't smoke crack in the lab certainly. We 
have -- we have as demonstrations and as education for 
ourselves actually made crack in our laboratory. 
Q. And do you burn it to where the fumes come up into 
your face? 
A. Not significantly into our face, no. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 I Q. Exactly. I would like to have done that in this 
2 | court, but I realize thdt would be illegal because that would 
3 | be an ingestion of an illegal substance, wouldn't it? 
A. Well, you're the attorney so --
5 | Q. Yeah. Okay. Now, you've indicated there is a 
6 I standard -- I mean, there is a sale -- smell that you can 
7 smell. What is that smell, do you know? 
8 A. I have not detected anything -- any smell that I 
9 would say this is consistent with cocaine. 
10 Q. But you have smelled the smell. 
11 A. I have from time to time detected an odor which was 
12 from something other than cocaine in the mixture of cocaine. 
13 Q. Okay. Or that you're assuming is from something 
14 other than cocaine. 
15 A. And I'm assuming that because it's not there on a 
16 regular basis. 
17 Q. But you are smelling cocaine when burned with 
18 mixtures. 
19 I A. I don't believe I'm smelling cocaine at all. 
20 Q. You're smelling something when mixed with something 
21 else. Correct? 
22 A. I'm smelling something. 
23 Q. And the -- and you're doing that on a controlled 
24 basis m a laboratory. Correct? 
25 A. Yes. 
Diane W. Flanagan, PPR 
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1 Q. Now I want to go out on the street. Okay? People 
2 mix cocaine with other things, don't they? 
3 A. With numerous things. 
4 Q. Numerous things. But there may be police officers 
5 who work cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking on a nightly 
6 basis who smell particular things that it's mixed with on a 
7 regular basis. You can see that, can't you? 
8 A. What I can -- what I can say is that they may smell 
9 something on a regular basis, but that is not something that 
10 I would as a scientist say is -- is definitive enough or 
11 regular enough to say this is cocaine as opposed to the same 
12 thing being mixed with non-cocaine or not being mixed with 
13 anything. 
14 Q. What are the kids on the streets mixing their crack 
15 cocaine with these days, the last two weeks? 
16 A. Oh, I don't know the last two weeks. 
17 Q. You don't know, do you? 
18 A. No. Crack cocaine is -- they don't cut crack 
19 cocaine like they do powder cocaine. So what's there is a 
20 residue from the -- from the original powder cocaine. 
21 Q. Or from a crack pipe --
22 A. Well, it could --
23 Q. -- being used? 
24 A. It could have been a crack pipe -- a residue from a 
25 previous smoke, if you will, yeah. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 Q. Right. And so the officers who are regularly on the 
2 street who are regularly finding cocaine and methamphetamme 
3 and things of that nature may be smelling distinctive 
4 different combinations every time they pick up coke and you 
5 might not know that. Isn't that a fair statement, Jim? 
6 A. I would question whether that smell is sufficiently 
7 related to cocaine to be able to say with any certainty that 
8 it's not methamphetamme, it's not bunk, bogus, something 
9 that doesn't have any cocaine in it or simply a residue. 
10 That's my problem --
11 Q. That's fine. 
12 A. — with this. 
13 Q. That answers my question. Now let's go back 
14 through, though. When you then overlay a level -- and you're 
15 not a lawyer so I don't expect you to know this -- as low as 
16 the U.S. Supreme Court has defined reasonable, articulable 
17 suspicion to be, that is not a level that scientists operate 
18 on. Fair statement, Mr. Gaskill? 
19 A. I think we probably operate on lots of levels, and I 
20 don't know that we operate on probable cause or reasonable 
21 suspicion or --
22 Q. Exactly. 
23 A. -- beyond a reasonable doubt. 
24 Q. What you are trying to do is determine whether some 
25 certain type of thing is a substance. Isn't that correct? 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 A. Yeah, but we do that on various levels as well. We 
2 start with, for example, a color test. We bring the -- we 
3 bring the suspected cocaine into me, and I add to it a 
4 mixture which is known to turn blue in the presence of 
5 cocaine. If it turns blue, then I have a suspicion that it 
6 is perhaps cocaine. But there are other things that will 
7 also turn blue besides cocaine --
8 Q. Exactly. 
9 A. -- so I have to proceed to --
10 Q. Let's stop right there. 
11 A. -~ a higher level. 
12 MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, I'm going to ask that he 
13 be allowed to answer his question, that Mr. Daines --
14 MR. DAINES: I don't think he's answering my 
15 question right now. That is exactly the level I want to stop 
16 at. 
17 MR. RICHARDS: And I'd also --
18 THE COURT: That's not Mr. Richard's objection, if I 
19 understand. I think what he is saying is that you tend to 
20 cut him off before he has finished his response. 
21 MR. DAINES: Well, the problem is he's then going to 
22 a different level, and this is the level I would like to 
23 interrogate him on. 
24 THE COURT: I understand, but out of courtesy to the 
25 witness, let him finish, and then if you feel like he's not 
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1 responding, you can ask the Court to ask him to respond to 
2 your questions. 
3 MR. DAINES: Okay. 
4 Q (BY MR. DAINES) Go ahead. Tell us on what you've 
5 been over this. 
6 A. So when I -- when I receive a blue color, I think, 
7 well, there may be some cocaine there. But it may be 
8 something else that also reacts with cocaine -- or with --
9 with the cobalt thiocyanate. And so I -- I would never 
10 presume that that was cocaine simply because it turned blue. 
11 Simply narrows down my option at this point, gives me a 
12 direction to go m , but I would not --
13 Q. Gives you a suspicion. 
14 A. -- call it cocaine. Suspicion is probably a pretty 
15 good word at this point. 
16 Q. Exactly, Thank you. Okay. The judge wants you to 
17 keep going apparently. 
18 A. That's my answer. I'm through. 
19 Q. Okay. Good. All right. 
20 MR. DAINES: I have no further questions of this 
21 witness, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Let me ask a question. Why is cocaine 
23 mixed with other things? Why isn't it just -- why isn't the 
24 pure unadulterated drug used in some fashion? Is it just too 
25 expensive that way? 
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THE WITNESS: Well, you can make a lot more money if 
you sell -- if you buy an ounce and you -- and you dilute it 
to two ounces, then can make nearly twice as much money. 
THE COURT: Because the — 
THE WITNESS: (Unintelligible) don't do it. 
THE COURT: -- unsuspecting buyer doesn't know 
whether it's pure or whether it's --
THE WITNESS: The buyer doesn't know whether it's 
pure. The buyer doesn't know even sometimes whether there's 
any cocaine there or not. That's one of the real dangers 
with street drugs. 
THE COURT: What often — what kind of substances 
would cocaine be mixed with in a form that might then be 
smoked in a pipe or otherwise used? 
THE WITNESS: Well, they mix it with a lot of things 
that are white: Sugars, other cains, procaine, Novocain. 
They mix it with anasatol. They mix it with lots of 
different things, depending on where it's coming from and 
what's available. As long as it comes out to be pretty 
reasonably white and loose as a powder, then it will -- it 
will work. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Any other questions? 
MR. RICHARDS: (Unintelligible) follow up. 
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1 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 
3 BY MR. RICHARDS: 
4 Q. If all of these substances -- let me back up. 
5 You're aware of numerous different substances that people 
6 have mixed cocaine with. 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Okay. And you try to keep up on that as you teach 
9 about it. 
10 MR. DAINES: Objection, Your Honor. That's leading. 
11 He — he says he's not on the streets. 
12 THE COURT: It was a leading question. 
13 MR. RICHARDS: It was. I'll state it better. 
14 Q (BY MR. RICHARDS) Why do you keep up on those things 
15 that cocaine is cut with? 
16 A. Well, in a teaching mode I do it just so that I can 
17 know what I'm talking about. In the laboratory we would do 
18 it sometimes for intelligence so that we could say, well, 
19 this is perhaps related to other submissions. Then we know 
20 where those submissions came from so we may be able to link 
21 them up and show that they are a certain supplier or certain 
22 area of supplier. 
23 Q. And is there any particular cut smell that would 
24 identify cocaine to you? 
25 A. No. 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: That's all the questions I have. 
2 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
3 BY MR. DAINES: 
4 Q. But if there's a cut smell that individual officers 
5 smell every time they find coke, that might create your 
6 turning blue suspicion, is it cocaine if the officers don't 
7 see that. 
8 A. Well, I just don't accept that as a -- as a 
9 reasonable thesis. 
10 Q. If they're -- if every time they get cocaine they're 
11 smelling a particular smell which might be a particular cut 
12 but every time they find it they smell that, you don't think 
13 that at least gives them a suspicion that there's cocaine? 
14 A. If you could --
15 MR. RICHARDS: Objection, Your Honor, he's asking 
16 for a legal conclusion. He's already said that Mr. --
17 MR. DAINES: No. He's the one who used the word 
18 suspicion when cocaine turns blue. I didn't. 
19 MR. RICHARDS: If he wants to let him talk about 
20 legal standard, that's fine with me. 
21 MR. DAINES: I'm just trying to see what he will 
22 deny here, Your Honor. I'm in cross-examination. Obviously 
23 (unintelligible) behavior. 
24 THE COURT: What do you mean by a cut of cocaine? 
25 THE WITNESS: Cut is the thing they mix it with to 
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James H. Gaskill 
Consultant in Forensic Science 
7909 S. 2100 E. Ogden, Utah 84405 
801 479-5279 
March 5, 2009 
Mr. Richards, 
In a conversation yesterday, you asked me to express my opinion, based on years of drug testing, 
regarding the odor of cocaine and the likelihood of a person recognizing its smell. I have handled literally 
thousands of samples of cocaine, including samples that have been diluted, and pure pharmaceutical 
samples. There is no specific odor that is discemable by my nose, nor by any of my friends and 
associates in the forensic science field. 
Cocaine can be processed or hidden with other chemicals that impart various odors, but none of 
them are present on all, or even a majority, of samples. Various smells have been anecdotally attributed 
to cocaine, but these smells are associated with other chemicals. I do not believe that any smell detected 
by humans is a reliable indicator of cocaine. 
Several years ago, a cocaine "smell" case was adjudicated in Federal Dist. Court in Salt Lake. I 
testified in that case, but I cannot remember the name. You could ask Deirdre Gorman. She was the 
defense attorney and will likely be able to give you a reference. You may also want to refer to a separate 
federal case, U.S. vs. Juan Heriberto Carrillo, No. 93-50078, Ninth U.S. circuit 29 F.3rd 635. 
Cocaine hydrochloride, the most common form, has a high boiling point and is not "smoked". The 
form that is heated in a pipe is cocaine base, often called crack. No actual smoke is generated in this 
process. The vaporized cocaine is inhaled. 
If I can be of more assistance in this or other matters, please feel free to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
'&7m<7 
James Gaskill, Forensic Consultant 
Asst. Prof. Emeritus 
Weber State University 
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§77-23-104. Written plan — Approval of magistrate. 
(1) An administrative traffic checkpoint may be established and operated upon 
written authority of a magistrate. 
(2) A magistrate may issue written authority to establish and operate an 
administrative traffic checkpoint if: 
(a) a command level officer submits to the magistrate a written plan signed by 
the command level officer describing: 
(i) the location of the checkpoint including geographical and topographical 
information; 
(ii) the date, time, and duration of the checkpoint; 
(iii) the sequence of traffic to be stopped; 
(iv) the purpose of the checkpoint, including the inspection or inquiry to be 
conducted; 
(v) the minimum number of personnel to be employed in operating the 
checkpoint, including the rank of the officer or officers in charge at the scene; 
(vi) the configuration and location of signs, barriers, and other means of 
informing approaching motorists that they must stop and directing them to the 
place to stop; 
(vii) any advance notice to the public at large of the establishment of the 
checkpoint; and 
(viii) the instructions to be given to the enforcement officers operating the 
checkpoint; 
(b) the magistrate makes an independent judicial determination that the plan 
appropriately: 
(i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will be delayed; 
(ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or inquiry; 
(iii) minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist will experience; 
(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exercised by the individual 
enforcement officers operating the checkpoint; and 
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the enforcement officers; and 
(c) the administrative traffic checkpoint has the primary purpose of inspecting, 
verifying, or detecting: 
(i) drivers that may be under the influence of alcohol or drugs; 
(ii) license plates, registration certificates, insurance certificates, or driver 
licenses; 
(iii) violations of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code of Utah; or 
(iv) other circumstances that are specifically distinguishable by the magistrate 
from a general interest in crime control. 
(3) Upon determination by the magistrate that the plan meets the requirements 
of Subsection (2), the magistrate shall sign the authorization and issue it to the 
command level officer, retaining a copy for the court's file. 
(4) A copy of the plan and signed authorization shall be issued to the checkpoint 
command level officer participating in the operation of the checkpoint. 
(5) Any enforcement officer participating in the operation of the checkpoint 
shall conform his activities as nearly as practicable to the procedures outlined in 
the plan. 
(6) The checkpoint command level officer shall be available to exhibit a copy of 
the plan and signed authorization to any motorist who has been stopped at the 
checkpoint upon request of the motorist. 
